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1. Introduction
Price competition is usually modelled as a game with a continuum of prices available
to each competitor. If the good is homogeneous, payoﬀ discontinuities naturally
arise. For instance, in canonical Bertrand competition, the slightest undercutting of
competitors’ lowest price results in a discrete upward jump in sales. As is well-known,
if the competing ﬁrms have the same constant average cost, then their common and
constant marginal cost is the unique Nash equilibrium market price. By contrast, if
marginal costs are strictly increasing, then there is a whole continuum of equilibrium
market prices (Dastidar, 1995). In both settings, even the slightest uncertainty about
competitors’ price choices might lead ﬁrms to deviate from any given equilibrium
price vector. It is then arguably reasonable to require equilibria to be robust to small
amounts of uncertainty about other players’ strategies.
In this note we formalize a notion of strategic uncertainty and propose a criterion
for robustness to such uncertainty. Our approach is roughly as follows. Given any
game with ﬁnitely many players in which each player’s strategy set is a continuum,
a player’s uncertainty about others’ strategy choices is represented by a probability
distribution anchored at those strategies and scaled with a parameter t ≥ 0.T h e
probability distributions are assumed to be atomless and have standard properties.
For each level of this perturbation parameter t,w ed e ﬁne a t-equilibrium as a Nash
equilibrium of the accordingly perturbed game, in which each player strives to maxi-
mize her expected payoﬀ under her strategic uncertainty. We call a strategy proﬁle of
t h eo r i g i n a lg a m er o b u s tt os t r a t e g i cu n c e r t ainty if there exists a collection of prob-
ability distributions, one for each player, such that some accompanying sequence of
t-equilibria converges to this proﬁle, as the perturbation parameter t tends to zero.
We call the strategy proﬁle strictly robust if this holds for all probability distributions
in the admitted class. The aim of this note is limited: we here only study in detail
the implications of these deﬁnitions for a particular class of games.
We apply this reﬁnement to Bertrand competition.1 By way of a simple duopoly
example with constant and identical marginal costs, we ﬁr s ts h o wt h a to u rr e ﬁnement
admits the unique and weakly dominated Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, when mar-
ginal costs are strictly increasing, our robustness criterion selects a unique strategy
proﬁle out of the continuum of Nash equilibria. This prediction agrees with re-
cent ﬁndings in experimental studies of (discretized versions of) Dastidar’s (1995)
model, see Abbink and Brandts (2008) and Argenton and Müller (2009).2 Abbink
1Following Vives (1999, p.117), we take Bertrand competition to mean that (a) sellers simulta-
neously choose their prices and (b) each ﬁrm has to serve all its clients at the price it has chosen.
2Abbink and Brandts (2008) ran experiments with ﬁxed groups of two, three, and four identical
ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that duopolists are often able to collude on the joint proﬁt-maximizing price.
However, the lowest price in the range of Nash equilibria which involves no loss in case of mis-
coordination (24 in their speciﬁcation), a much smaller number than the collusive price, is also anRobustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 3
and Brandts (2008) remark that “[that] price level (...) is not predicted by any
benchmark theory [they] are aware of” (p. 3). The present reﬁnement provides a the-
oretical foundation for their ﬁnding. Heuristically, strategic uncertainty, as modelled
here, results in perturbed proﬁtf u n c t i o n st h a ta r ec o n t i n u o u s ,s i n c et h el i k e l i h o o do f
serving the entire market is continuous in one’s own price. The deviation incentives
are asymmetric, though. For high Nash equilibrium prices, a strategically uncertain
player has an incentive to cut her price, since she has a lot to lose if others’ prices
lie a bit below her price and little to gain if they lie a bit above it. Conversely, for
low Nash equilibrium prices, each player has an incentive to raise her price, since she
has a lot to loose if others’ prices lie a bit above her price and little to gain if they
lie a bit below. The only price that is robust to strategic uncertainty is the price at
which the monopoly proﬁt is zero. This is also the maximal Nash equilibrium price
in the limit as the number of competitors tend to inﬁnity. At that price, and no other
price, the incentives to move up and down for a strategically uncertain player are of
t h es a m eo r d e ro fm a g n i t u d e .
Our robustness criterion is closely related to Selten’s (1975) “substitute perfec-
tion”. Selten deﬁned a Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite game to have this property if
there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy proﬁles, converging to the equi-
librium in question, such that each player’s equilibrium strategy is a best reply to
all but ﬁnitely many strategy proﬁles in the sequence. Substitute perfect equilibria
exist in all ﬁnite games, and, as Selten (1975) shows, they coincide with (trembling-
hand) perfect equilibria. However, in generic non-linear games with continuum strat-
egy spaces, no Nash equilibrium is literally substitute perfect, the reason being that
small perturbations of players’ beliefs induce small changes in their best replies (while
the discreteness in ﬁnite games allows best replies to remain unchanged under such
perturbations).
Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) extended Selten’s perfection criterion to games
with compact strategy sets and continuous payoﬀ functions. By contrast, we here
focus on a class of games with discontinuous payoﬀ functions. Binmore (1987) and
Carlsson (1991) study equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game (Nash, 1953),
which also admits a continuum of equilibria. Both authors assume that players “trem-
ble.” By contrast, players do not “tremble” in our model; they are only uncertain
about other players’ action. Carlsson and Ganslandt (1998) investigate “noisy equi-
librium selection” in symmetric coordination games and derive results that agree with
the experimental ﬁndings on minimal eﬀort games in Van Huyck et al. (1990). While
Carlsson and Ganslandt’s (1998) study is tailored to the minimal eﬀort game, we
attractor of play. With more than two ﬁrms in a market, it actually is the predominant market
price. This outcome is also observed in the complete information, symmetric treatment in Argenton
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here make general assumptions concerning players’ beliefs, assumptions that permit
an operational deﬁnition of robustness to strategic uncertainty for a large class of
games. Our approach is related to that in Friedman and Mezzetti (2005), who in-
troduce a notion of “robust equilibria” in ﬁnite games, as the limit of sequences of
“random belief equilibria.” In a random belief equilibrium, all players’ beliefs are
random variables, and a player’s best-reply distribution, implied by her belief distri-
bution, is required to be consistent, in terms of statistical expectation, with others’
beliefs about that player’s action. By contrast, we analyze continuum-action games
and impose no such consistency requirement.
The application is here to Bertrand games in which ﬁrms are committed to serve
any demand addressed to them at the posted price; they cannot turn customers down
or ration them. As mentioned by Vives (1999), for certain utilities and auctions,
provision is legally mandated, and in other markets ﬁrms have a strong incentive to
serve all their clients, especially in industries in which customers have an on-going
relationship with suppliers (subscription, repeat purchases, etc.) or where the costs
of restricting output in real time are high. There are a number of papers focused on
price competition with convex costs. Dixon (1990) studies such competition when
ﬁrms are not obliged to serve all demand, but incur a cost when turning costumers
down. He shows that under such circumstances there may still exist a continuum
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Spulber (1995) assumes that ﬁrms are uncertain
about rivals’ costs and shows that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies. As the number of ﬁrms grows, equilibrium pricing strategies tend
to average cost pricing. Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004) show that, in Bertrand
games with convex costs, there exists a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (in
the sense of Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston 1987), which converges to the competitive
outcome under free entry. Our criterion selects another price, which, moreover, does
not depend on the number of ﬁrms.
2. Robustness to strategic uncertainty
Let G =( N,S,π) be an n-player normal-form game with player set N = {1,...,n},i n
which the pure-strategy set of each player is the real line, Si = R, and thus S = Rn
is the set of pure-strategy proﬁles s =( s1,...,sn),a n dπ : S → Rn is the combined
payoﬀ-function, with πi (s) being the payoﬀ to player i when s is played.3
Let F be the class of cumulative probability distribution functions F : R → [0,1]
with everywhere positive and continuous density f = F0 and with non-decreasing
hazard rate, that is, such that the hazard-rate function h : R → R+,d e ﬁned by
h(x)=
f (x)
1 − F (x)
,
3See below for how this machinery can be adapted to restrictions on strategy sets.Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 5
is non-decreasing.4 Examples of probability distributions with this property are the
normal, exponential and Gumbel distributions. Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show
that a suﬃcient condition for this property is that f be log-concave,t h a ti s ,t h a tlogf
be a (strictly) concave function.5
Deﬁnition 1. For any given t ≥ 0,as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle s is a t-equilibrium of G if,
for each player i, the strategy si maximizes i’s expected payoﬀ under the probabilistic
belief that all other players’ strategies are random variables of the form
˜ sij = sj + t · εij (1)
for some statistically independent “noise” terms εij ∼ Φij,w h e r eΦij ∈ F for all
j 6= i.
Remark 1. For t =0 ,t h i sd e ﬁnition coincides with that of Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2. For t>0, the random variable ˜ sij has the c.d.f. Ft









Note that we do not require that noise terms are symmetric or have expectation
zero, only that Φij has a non-decreasing hazard rate. In particular, in a t-equilibrium
players may believe that others have a systematic tendency to deviate upwards or
downwards.
Example 1. Let Φij be a normal distribution, N (μ,σ),w i t hμ = σ =1 , and hence
E [˜ sij]=sj +t. Then the density ft
ij is skewed to the right, as shown in the diagram
below for sj =1 0 ,a n dt =0 .3 (thick), t =0 .1 (dashed) and t =0 .05 (thin).
Let ˜ s−i denote the (n − 1)-vector of random variables (˜ sij)j6=i. W en o t et h a ta
t-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoﬀ functions:
Remark 3. Let t>0 and Φij ∈ F for all i ∈ N and j 6= i.A s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle
s ∈ S is a t-equilibrium of G =( N,S,π),w i t hεij ∼ Φij, if and only if it is a Nash
4For the present application, this condition is suﬃcient. However, in other applications the
methodology developed here may require, for asymmetric noise distributions, that a corresponding
condition be imposed on the “reversed hazard rate”, the density divided by the mass of the left tail.
5The log-concavity assumption is common in the economics literature and has applications in
mechanism design, game theory and labor economics, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 6








Figure 1: Player i’s probabilitic belief about sj
equilibrium of the game Gt =( N,S,πt),w h e r e
π
t







































We are now in a position to deﬁne robustness to strategic uncertainty.
Deﬁnition 2. As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle s∗ in the game G is robust to strategic uncer-
tainty if there exists a collection of c.d.f:s {Φij ∈ F : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} a n da na c c o m -
panying sequence of t-equilibria, hstkik∈N with tk ↓ 0, such that stk → s∗ as k → +∞.
The strategy proﬁle s∗ is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty if this holds for all
collections of c.d.f:s {Φij ∈ F : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i}.
Remark 4. This deﬁnition can be adapted as follows to games in which the strategy































0 if x<s j
1 if x ≥ sjRobustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 7
Taking expectations with respect to such c.d.f:s Ft

















































We note that for any interior strategy proﬁle, s ∈ ×i∈N (0,b i), our robustness criterion
is the same, whether or not the noise terms are ﬁtted to the strategy sets in this way:
for any sj ∈ (0,b j), the denominator in (2) converges to 1 and its derivative converges




















As we show in the subsequent sections, this deﬁnition of robustness selects a
unique Nash equilibrium out of a continuum of equilibria in a class of price competi-
tion games. Before embarking on that analysis, let us brieﬂy consider the canonical
Bertrand model of pure price competition.
Example 2. Consider two identical ﬁrms, each with constant unit cost c>0,i na
simultaneous-move pricing game à la Bertrand in a market for a homogeneous good.
Let the demand function be linear, D(p)=a−p, for all p ∈ [0,a] with a>c .6 Then,
the monopoly proﬁt function, Π(p)=( a−p)(p−c), is strictly concave with a unique
maximum at pm =( a + c)/2 and Π(pm) > 0. By contrast, the unique duopoly Nash
equilibrium, p1 = p2 = c, results in zero proﬁts. This Nash equilibrium is weakly
dominated. Nevertheless, it is robust to strategic uncertainty. For suﬃciently small
degrees of strategic uncertainty, both ﬁrms will set their prices a little bit above
marginal cost, and less so, the less uncertain they are. To see this, suppose that























· Π(pi) i =1 ,2,j6= i.
6To keep the intuition clear, we take a simple functional form but the argument extends to general
demand curves.
7We focus on symmetric error distributions in this example only for expositional convenience.
The Nash equilibrium is robust to strategic uncertainty under asymmetric distributions as well.Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 8
This can be rewritten as
π
t








· Π(pi) i =1 ,2,j6= i,
where the ﬁrst factor is positive and independent of pi. A necessary ﬁrst-order







i =1 ,2,j6= i. (4)
The RHS of (4) is a positive constant. Consequently, in the perturbed game, it is
never optimal to choose pi ≤ c or pi ≥ pm. Hence, without loss of generality, we
restrict attention to pi ∈ (c,pm). On this interval, the LHS is a continuous and
strictly decreasing function that runs from plus inﬁnity to zero. Hence, there exists
a unique symmetric t-equilibrium price, pt, for every t>0. Moreover, as t → 0,t h e
denominator of the LHS has to tend to zero for (4) to hold. Consequently, pt ↓ c.
The diagram below shows how the t-equilibrium price pt depends on t,w h e nΦ is the
standard normal distribution, a =1and c =0 .2.







Figure 2: The t−equilibrium price as a function of t in the standard Bertrand game.
3. Price competition with convex costs
There are n ≥ 2 ﬁrms i ∈ N = {1,2,...,n} in a market for a homogeneous good.
Aggregate demand D : R+ −→ R+ is twice diﬀerentiable and such that D(0) =
qmax ∈ R and D(pmax)=0for some pmax,q max > 0.9 Moreover, we assume that
8It is easily veriﬁed that there does not exist any asymmetric t-equilibrium.
9In this section, we follow closely Dastidar (1995).Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 9
D0(p) < 0 for all p ∈ (0,p max).A l l ﬁrms i simultaneously set their prices pi ∈ R+.
Let p =( p1,p 2,...,pn) be the resulting strategy proﬁle (or price vector). The minimal
price, p0 := min{p1,p 2,...,pn}, will be called the (going) market price.L e tk be the




D(p0)/k if pi = p0
0 otherwise
All ﬁrms have the same cost function, C : R+ −→ R+, which is twice diﬀerentiable
with C(0) = 0 and C0,C00 > 0.E a c hﬁrm is required to serve all demand addressed
to it at its posted price. The proﬁtt oe a c hﬁrm i is thus
πi(p)=
½
p0D(p0)/k − C [D(p0)/k] if pi = p0
0 otherwise (5)
This deﬁnes a simultaneous-move n-player game G in which each player i has
pure-strategy set R+ and payoﬀ function πi : Rn
+ → R,d e ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) . A
strategy proﬁle p will be called symmetric if p1 = ... = pn, and we will call a price
p ∈ R+ a symmetric Nash equilibrium price if p =( p,p,...,p) is a Nash equilibrium
of G. For each positive integer k ≤ n and non-negative price p,l e t
vk (p)=pD(p)/k − C [D(p)/k]
This deﬁnes a ﬁnite collection of twice diﬀerentiable functions, hvkik∈{1,2,..,n},w h e r e
vk (p) is the proﬁtt oe a c ho fk ﬁrms if they all quote the same price p and all other
ﬁrms post higher prices (so that p is the going market price). In particular, v1 deﬁnes
the proﬁt to a monopolist as a function of its price p.
We impose one more condition on C and D, namely, that the associated monopoly
proﬁt function, v1, is strictly concave. More exactly, we assume that v00
1 < 0 and
v0
1 (pmon)=0for some price pmon ∈ (0,p max). Since the cost function is strictly con-
vex by assumption, this concavity assumption on v1 eﬀectively requires the demand
function to be “not too convex”.10 We have v1(pmon) ≥ 0. By convexity of the cost
function, there exists prices p ∈ (0,p max) at which all n ﬁrms, when quoting the same
price p, make positive proﬁts, vn(p) > 0.
Game G has a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria.11 For any number of ﬁrms,
n ≥ 2,l e tˇ pn ∈ (0,p max) be the price p at which vn(p)=0and let ˆ pn ∈ (0,p max)
be the price p at which vn(p)=v1(p). Dastidar (1995, Lemmas 1, 5 and 6) shows
existence and uniqueness of ˇ pn and ˆ pn and that ˇ pn < ˆ pn. As also shown in Dastidar
10This is a more stringent assumption than the one made in Dastidar (1995), who instead assumes
that there exists a unique monopoly price.
11Dastidar (1995) and Weibull (2006) have shown existence and multiplicity of Nash equilibria
under weaker conditions.Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 10
(1995, Proposition 1), all prices in the interval PNE
n =[ ˇ pn, ˆ pn] are symmetric Nash
equilibrium prices in the game G, and no price outside this interval is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium price.
As shown in Dastidar (1995, Lemmas 4 and 6), there exists a unique price ¯ p
at which a monopolist makes zero proﬁt, v1 (¯ p)=0 ,a n d ,m o r e o v e r ,¯ p ∈ (ˇ pn, ˆ pn).
Dastidar (1995, Lemma 7) also shows that both ˇ pn and ˆ pn are strictly decreasing
in n. In the present setting, it is easily veriﬁed that ˇ pn ↓ 0 and ˆ pn ↓ ¯ p, and hence
PNE
n → (0, ¯ p],a sn →∞ .
Example 3. Consider a duopoly with identical ﬁrms with quadratic cost functions,
C (q)=cq2,w h e r ec =0 .2, and linear aggregate demand: D(p)=m a x {0,1 − p}.
The diagram below shows the graphs of v1 (dashed curve) and v2 (solid curve). The
associated set, PNE
2 ,i st h ei n t e r v a l[1/11,3/13], indicated by the two solid vertical
lines, and ¯ p =1 /6 is indicated by the dashed vertical line.








Figure 3: Monopoly (dashed) and duopoly (solid) proﬁts, as functions of a common
price p.
We make two further observations. First, that ˆ pn cannot exceed the monopoly
price, and second, that the pricing game G admits no asymmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. ˆ pn ≤ pmon for all n>1.
Proof: Dastidar (1995; Lemma 3) shows that, if vn(p) ≥ v1(p) then v1(p) >
v1(p − α), ∀α>0 for p − α ∈ [0,p).S o ,i fp is a Nash equilibrium, then the left-
derivative of v1 at p must be positive. The concavity of v1 implies that ˆ pn ≤ pmon.
End of proof.Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 11
Proposition 2. Every Nash equilibrium in G is symmetric.
Proof:L e t(p1,...,pn) be a Nash equilibrium. Suppose, ﬁrst, that pi < minj6=i pj
for some i.I fpi < ˆ pn,t h e nﬁrm i could increase its proﬁt by unilaterally increasing
its price. Hence, pi ≥ ˆ pn.I f pi ≤ pmon,t h e na n yﬁrm j 6= i could increase its
proﬁt by unilaterally decreasing its price to pi and earn v2(pi) > 0 instead of zero. If
pi >p mon then ﬁrm i can increase its proﬁt by a unilateral deviation to pmon. Hence,
pi ≥ minj6=i pj for all i. Suppose, secondly, that pi =m i n j6=i pj and that pk >p i for
some k.E i t h e rv|j∈N:pj=pi|(pi) > 0 or v|j∈N:pj=pi|(pi)=0 .( I fv|j∈N:pj=pi|(pi) < 0,t h e n
i can proﬁtably deviate to pmax a n de a r nz e r op r o ﬁt.) In any case, k can proﬁtably
deviate to pi and make a positive proﬁt since by strict convexity of C,i fvl(p) ≥ 0,
then vl+1(p) > 0. Hence, pi = pj for all i,j ∈ N.End of proof.
4. Robust price equilibrium
We proceed to apply the robustness deﬁnition from Section 2 to the pricing game
described in Section 3. Let t>0 and suppose that a ﬁrm i holds a probabilistic belief
of form (1) about other ﬁrms’ prices. For any price pi that ﬁrm i might contemplate
to set, its subjective probability that any other ﬁrm will choose exactly the same
price is zero. Hence, with probability one, its own price will either lie above the going
m a r k e tp r i c eo ri tw i l lb et h eg o i n gm a r k e tp r i c ea n da l lo t h e rﬁrms’ prices will be
higher, so i will then be a monopolist at its price pi. From equation (3), each ﬁrm i’s
payoﬀ function in the perturbed game Gt =( N,S,πt) is, for any t>0,d e ﬁned by
π
t





















The second factor being positive and independent of pi,ap r i c ep r o ﬁle p is a Nash
equilibrium of Gt if and only if

















and the restriction p ∈ [¯ p,pmon] is non-binding, since v1 (p) < 0 for all p<¯ p, v1 (p) > 0
for all p ∈ (¯ p,pmon),a n dv0
1 (p) < 0 for all p>p mon.F o r a n y t>0,l e t ¯ Gt be the
normal-form game (N,[¯ p,pmon]
n ,u t). We have established
Lemma 1. For any t>0,ap r i c ep r o ﬁle p is a t-equilibrium in the pricing game G
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the game ¯ Gt.Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 12
Proposition 3. Let t>0 and assume that {Φij : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} ⊂ F.T h e n ¯ Gt has
at least one Nash equilibrium. Moreover, any such Nash equilibrium pt is interior.
Proof: The strategy sets in ¯ Gt are compact and all payoﬀ functions are con-
tinuous. Existence of Nash equilibrium follows if, moreover, each player’s payoﬀ is
quasi-concave in the player’s own strategy. To see whether this is the case, diﬀeren-



























where hij is the hazard-rate function of Φij. This is a continuous function of pi.T h e
expression in the ﬁrst square bracket is positive and decreasing. Moreover, v0
1 and
v1 are both positive on (¯ p,pmon),w i t hv0
1 decreasing from a positive value towards
zero, and v1 increasing from zero to a positive value (by the assumed concavity of
v1). Since hazard-rates are non-decreasing by assumption, each term in the sum is
non-decreasing in pi. Hence, the expression in the second square bracket is decreasing
from a positive to a negative value. Hence, ∂ut
i/∂pi is decreasing in pi,s out
i is concave
in pi on [¯ p,pmon], and thus also quasi-concave. This establishes existence. Clearly, no
price can lie on the boundary of the strategy set in ¯ Gt,s i n c e∂ut
i/∂pi is positive at
its left boundary and negative at its right boundary. End of proof.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium (¯ p,..., ¯ p) is strictly robust to strategic uncer-
tainty. No other strategy proﬁle of G is robust to strategic uncertainty.
Proof: Let {Φij : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} ⊂ F. Consider any sequence htki
∞
k=1 → 0,w h e r e
each tk > 0.F o re a c hk ∈ N,l e tpk be a Nash equilibrium of ¯ Gtk. Since all games
¯ Gtk have the same strategy space, [¯ p,pmon]
n, and this is non-empty and compact, the
sequence hptki
∞
k=1 contains a convergent subsequence with limit in [¯ p,pmon]
n, accord-
ing to the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem. Hence, without loss of generality we may
assume that limk→∞ pk = p∗ ∈ [¯ p,pmon]
n.
First, we prove that p∗
i = p∗
j for all i,j ∈ N. For this purpose, note that ¯ p<p k
i <
























where hij is the hazard-rate function of Φij.C o n s i d e r a ﬁrm i ∈ N.S u p p o s e t h a t
p∗
j <p ∗
i for some j 6= i,a n dl e tε = p∗
i − p∗
j > 0. Then, there is a K such that
pk
i − pk
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i) as k →∞ ,s i n c ev1
is continuous, so v1 (p∗
i)=0 . Hence, p∗
i =¯ p. But this contradicts the hypothesis
p∗
i >p ∗
j ∈ [¯ p,pmon]. Hence, p∗
j ≥ p∗
i. Since holds for all i and j 6= i, we conclude that
p∗
j = p∗
i for all i,j ∈ N.
Secondly, we prove p∗





> 0 on (¯ p,pmon) and all














→ 0 ∀i,j 6= i
as k → +∞. Suppose that p∗
i > ¯ p.T h e nv1 (p∗








→ 0 ∀j 6= i
implying that pk
i <p k
j for all k suﬃciently large. But, by the same token: since
p∗
j = p∗
i,f o ra l lj 6= i,w ea l s oh a v ep∗
















i for all k suﬃciently large. Both strict inequalities cannot
hold. Hence, p∗
i =¯ p for all i ∈ N. In sum: the only strategy proﬁle that is robust
to strategic uncertainty is (¯ p,..., ¯ p). The strict robustness claim follows immediately
from the fact that the collection {Φij : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} ⊂ F above was arbitrary. End
of proof.
Example 4. Consider again a duopoly with identical ﬁrms, with quadratic cost
function, C (q)=0 .2q2, and linear aggregate demand: D(p)=m a x {0,1 − p}.
Suppose that both ﬁrms’ uncertainty takes the form of normally distributed noise,Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 14
ε1,ε 2 ∼ N (0,1).W et h e nh a v e¯ p =1 /6 ≈ 0.1667. The necessary ﬁrst-order condition

















The diagram below shows these “best-reply curves” (solid and dashed, respectively)
and t =0 .1,w i t h¯ p marked by thin straight lines.The next diagram illustrates the














Figure 4: The best-reply curves in the perturbed pricing game.
convergence of t-equilibria towards (¯ p, ¯ p)=( 1 /6,1/6). It displays the best-reply
curves of both players for t =0 .25 (solid curves), t =0 .1 (thin curves), and t =0 .05
(dashed curves). As t decreases, the intersection of the associated pair of curves
approaches (¯ p, ¯ p), the intersection between the thin horizontal and vertical lines.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated Bertrand games with convex costs. This is a class
of games with discontinuous payoﬀ functions and with a whole continuum of Nash
equilibria Arguably, strategic uncertainty will be considerable, due to the richness of
the strategy spaces and the large number of equilibria We have introduced a generalRobustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition 15









Figure 5: Convergence of t-equilibria towards (¯ p, ¯ p)
notion of robustness to strategic uncertainty and shown that this notion is powerful
enough to reduce the equilibrium set to a singleton in these price-competition games.
Although we here focus on a particular class of games, we believe that our concept of
robustness to strategic uncertainty has a wide domain of application. Indeed, in the
Nash demand game (Nash, 1953), which also has a continuum of Nash equilibria, we
can show that, under symmetric strategic uncertainty, the Nash bargaining solution
is the unique equilibrium outcome that is robust to strategic uncertainty.
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